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THE OVERREACTION HYPOTHESIS: AN EXAMINATION IN THE IRISH 
STOCK MARKET 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of financial markets to interpret information quickly and accurately has 
been the subject of considerable academic and professional debate for over thirty 
years.  Initially, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) was widely accepted and any 
dissenting opinion was considered heretical.  General acceptance of the hypothesis 
lead to a fundamental change in professional investor behaviour away from active 
investment management and towards passive investment management. 
 
However, the emergence of contradictory evidence, such as the existence of market 
anomalies and excess volatility, has in more recent times resulted in a critical re-
examination of the EMH.  More specifically, considerable evidence has emerged 
regarding idiosyncrasies in stock markets including the small firm effect, the turn-of-
year effect, the weekend effect, a low-priced stock effect etc. 
 
While these anomalies have been well documented it is by no means certain that 
they can be exploited by ordinary investors, due to increased transaction costs and 
the extra risk from pursuing an active investment strategy.  One anomaly that 
appears to offer this potential is the ‘overreaction effect’.  As Power and Lonie (1993) 
point out, "the overreaction effect has a claim to be regarded as one of the most 
important anomalies investigated during the 1980s" (p.326).  A number of reasons 
are put forward by the authors to support this: (i) the level of abnormal returns 
earned by this trading strategy is much larger than other anomalies, with significantly 
less transaction costs, (ii) whereas many of the other anomalies cannot be 
explained, the overreaction hypothesis is much more intuitively appealing, and (iii) 
the hypothesis is supported by evidence from cognitive psychology which shows that 
individuals will have a propensity to overreact to unanticipated information which 
affects their futures. 
 
Essentially, the overreaction hypothesis states that market participants have a 
tendency to overreact to both good and bad news, with the consequence that prices 
of certain stocks temporarily depart from their underlying fundamental values.  Given 
this tendency, positive abnormal returns can be earned by selling short those stocks 
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which have witnessed the largest increase in value (winners) and purchasing those 
stocks which have witnessed the most significant decrease in value (losers). 
 
While, at times controversial, evidence exists of an overreaction effect in most of the 
major stock markets, this paper seeks to answer the question of whether or not 
investors in the Irish equity market tend to overreact to new information as indicated 
by a predictable reversal in returns.1  In this regard, it is a study of market efficiency.  
While the concepts applied here are themselves not new and are based on 
investigations carried out by financial economists for over a decade, this paper is the 
first attempt to investigate the possibility of overreaction in the Irish equity market.2 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two details the 
background to the ‘Overreaction Hypothesis’ and places it in the context of studies in 
cognitive psychology.  The section also examines the extensive and disputed 
evidence as to the existence of an ‘overreaction effect’ and whether the evidence is 
consistent with investor irrationality or can be explained by other factors.  Section 
three presents the research design used to test for overreaction in the Irish market.  
This methodology is primarily based on the original work of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985).  Section four presents evidence on the overreaction effect in the Irish stock 
market.  The results suggest that an economically significant overreaction effect is 
present, which can only partly be explained by other factors.  Finally, Section five 
offers some conclusions and suggests some areas for further research. 
 
2. AN OVERREACTION EFFECT? 
The efficient market hypothesis has been of considerable interest to financial 
economists for over 30 years.  Indeed, much of recent financial theory is based on 
the assumption that markets are efficient.  This hypothesis in its simplest form states 
that is not possible to earn consistent abnormal returns by trading on the basis of 
available information. 
 
                                                 
1
 As will be noted later, evidence of a reversal in share returns is generally interpreted as being 
consistent with the overreaction effect.  Therefore, throughout this paper, and in common with much of 
the existing literature, the term ‘overreaction effect’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘returns 
reversal’.    
2
 This paper concentrates on testing for long-term reversal in return patterns.  However it is worth 
noting that short-term overreaction in security markets has also been the subject of considerable 
research (See Power and Lonie (1993) for a review). 
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Although initially almost universally accepted, a wide body of evidence has now 
emerged which has substantially weakened the rationale of this hypothesis.  One 
such challenge has come from the body of work investigating the overreaction effect.  
In its most general form, the overreaction hypothesis states that investors have a 
tendency to display a systematic overreaction to new information, causing there to 
be predictable reversal in the price of the security as the information is correctly 
processed. 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) explain the effect as follows: 
 
“If stock prices systematically overshoot, then their reversal should be 
predictable from past return data alone, with no use of any accounting data 
such as earnings.   Specifically, two hypotheses are suggested: (1) Extreme 
movements in stock prices will be followed by subsequent price movements in 
the opposite direction.  (2) The more extreme the initial price movement, the 
greater will be the subsequent adjustment." (p.795). 
 
2.1. The Link Between the Psychology of Individual Decision Making and 
Stock Market Returns 
The motivation behind much of the initial research on overreaction was based on 
research in cognitive psychology which revealed that the decision making of 
investors can deviate from the assumption of perfect rationality.  In several 
experiments, Tversky and Kahneman (1982) found ‘that people tend to rely on a 
limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex task of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations”(p.3).  In 
general, individuals base their decisions on the most striking, recent and available 
information instead of using all available information in a manner which conforms to 
rational behaviour.  Thus individuals outweigh the relevance of current information 
and extrapolate too far into the future on the basis of the present. 
 
Experiments have also show that judgement generally centres around the first few 
estimates of a particular problem or uncertainty rather than the ‘true’ value.  Thus 
individuals ‘anchor’ their assessment and have difficulty changing from the initial 
judgement even when new information warrants it.  Applied in the context of 
overreaction, ‘winner’ firms establish a reputation based on a history of prior 
excellent performance and loser firms suffer from the opposite ‘stereotyping’ based 
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on a past history of underperformance.  Once these opinions are initially formed, 
‘anchoring’ ensures that they are only gradually eradicated as information 
inconsistent with the stereotypes accumulates.  As a result the share price moves 
slowly in the opposite direction, leading to a mean-reverting pattern in share returns. 
 
Overall, the psychological explanation supports the belief that a general overreactive 
tendency may exist that gives rise to a mean reverting pattern in security returns.  
Although individuals make heuristic decisions that usually result in correct decisions, 
these heuristics can fail them at certain critical times leading to price changes that 
will overshoot, and then revert to correct values.  As Tversky and Kahneman (1982) 
conclude, “in general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors” (p. 3). 
 
Shiller (1984) has applied many of these ideas to the stock market.  He argues that 
the  more sophisticated investors react quickly to new information, causing the price 
of a security to change.  Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, the price 
rapidly rises or falls to its new correct level.  Then, other investors react to the (no 
longer new) information.  The later investors do not realise that the price change has 
already occurred and may very well already reflect a new equilibrium in an efficient 
market.  As the euphoria escalates, the price subsequently rises to levels way above 
or below the fundamental value.  Eventually, the price moves back to the 'correct' 
level as rationality returns to the market.3 
 
The main objection to this behavioural perspective is that a few rational arbitrageurs 
would intervene to correct the mispricing of securities induced by traders not acting 
in a fully rational fashion.  Undoubtedly, given the potential extent of the mispricing 
(as documented below) the inability of arbitrageurs to identify the anomaly is highly 
unlikely to explain the lack of intervention.  However, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
formally address the issue of how the anomaly could survive the process of 
arbitrage.  They argue that the existence of some rational agents is not sufficient to 
guarantee rational expectations equilibrium in an economy characterised by the 
presence of some quasi-rational agents.  Indeed, they argue that this issue raises a 
more general question of what are equilibrium conditions for a market in which 
agents are not fully rational.  Furthermore, Chopra et al. (1992) argue that periodic 
                                                 
3
 In an earlier paper, Shiller (1981) interpreted excessive volatility in stock prices as evidence of 
overreaction to news about dividends. 
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evaluation of institutional investors by their clients contributes to a general 
unwillingness to undertake long-term arbitrage positions.  Consequently, resources 
will be devoted to short-term arbitrage strategies at the expense of long-term 
opportunities.  As the trading strategies required necessitate the commitment of 
capital over long periods the opportunities may persist over time. 
 
The motivation behind the initial research of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) was to 
investigate empirically the link between stock market behaviour and the psychology 
of individual decision making.  Their objective was to show that a systematic 
relationship existed between the two phenomena.  Using monthly data from the 
United States for the period 1926-1982, they began by examining extreme 
performers over periods of 36 months.  ‘Losers’ and ‘winners’ were identified on the 
basis of their market-adjusted excess returns, and clustered into distinct portfolios 
(the portfolio formation period). The subsequent cumulative abnormal returns of the 
portfolios that were formed out of the extreme winners and the extreme losers were 
then examined (the test period).  They found that on average the loser portfolios 
outperform the market by 19.6% in the 36 months after their formation.  Winner 
portfolios by contrast exhibit a market relative underperformance of 5.0%.  Hence the 
average cumulative residual from an arbitrage portfolio (formed by short selling 
winner portfolios and buying loser portfolios) is a statistically significant gain of 
24.6%.  Over a 5 year horizon the results are even stronger with the strategy yielding 
an average return of 31.9%. 
 
De Bondt and Thaler also highlight a number of other observations that arose from 
their research, which have gained increased importance due to the subsequent 
academic debate.  First, the results show a recurring asymmetric pattern with the 
contribution to the arbitrage portfolio being much larger for losers than winners.  
Second, nearly all of the reversal in returns seems to be concentrated in January.  
Third, they observe that the average betas in the winner portfolios are significantly 
larger than the betas of the loser portfolios, implying the losers not only outperform 
the winners but are less risky.  In other words, after accounting for the lower risk of 
the past losers, the abnormal return differential with past winners would grow.  
Fourth, the overreaction phenomenon occurs mostly during the second and third 
year of the test period.  Indeed they find insignificant abnormal returns for the 
arbitrage portfolio over a 2 year horizon period.  However, this was not unexpected 
as they argue that the magnitude of the subsequent reversal would be conditional on 
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the extent of the initial overreaction (which generally increases as the portfolio 
formation periods lengthen). 
 
The evidence that the reversal in returns is not immediate has been documented 
elsewhere.  For example, Davidson and Dutia (1989) present evidence that using 
one year formation and test periods leads to a conclusion diametrically opposite to 
the one overreaction would predict.4  Numerous studies have observed a similar 
pattern of initial continuation of performance (see for example, Ball and Kothari 
(1988) and Chopra et al (1992)).  Furthermore, evidence from a study by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) of relative strength strategies (buying winners and selling losers) 
supports continuation followed by subsequent reversal.  The strategies initially yield 
abnormal returns over 3 to 12 months, followed by negative performance starting 
after approximately the first year and extending up to the third year.  As a result the 
original gains dissipate. 
 
De Bondt and Thaler’s results clearly imply market inefficiency and it is perhaps not 
surprising that the findings have resulted in a proliferation of subsequent studies 
which argue both for and against the ‘overreaction effect’.  Most of the work has 
concentrated on what Fama (1991) describes as the ‘joint-hypothesis problem’ when 
interpreting evidence of return predictability: namely, does the return predictability 
reflect rational variation through time in returns, irrational deviations of prices from 
fundamental values, or some combination of the two? 
 
2.2. Alternative Explanations of the Overreaction Effect 
While De Bondt and Thaler (1985) suggest that their results are a reflection of 
irrational behaviour by investors, other potential explanations have been put forward.  
First, De Bondt and Thaler assume that risk levels do not change between the 
portfolio formation period and the test period.  However, it can be argued that the 
level of risk in the winner and loser firms is likely to change as a direct result of their 
prior performance (Chan, 1988 and Ball and Kothari, 1989).  Therefore any 
subsequent reversal in returns could be a rational reflection of the change in risk.  
Second, as prior performance has a pronounced effect on company size, as 
measured by market capitalisation, the excess returns are only another manifestation 
                                                 
4
 They find that “if an investor had purchased the top 10 percent of securities in year t-1 and held them 
through year t, the investor would have earned an annual average abnormal return across 21 years of 
42.8%.  An investor purchasing the worst ten percent of all securities (a contrarian strategy) and holding 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No 38 
7 
of the ‘size effect’  (see for example, Chan, 1988 and Zarowin, 1990).  And finally, as 
almost all of the abnormal returns from their strategy are earned in January, it is 
questionable whether the phenomenon is merely a reflection of stock market 
seasonality or is an anomaly in its own right.  These issues are explored in more 
detail below. 
 
The risk change explanation of De Bondt and Thaler’s findings is based on the 
impact of prior performance on the market value of the firm’s equity.  As losers 
become losers, the market value of their equity inevitably falls, resulting in a 
pronounced change in the firm’s debt-equity ratio.  As the overall equity beta is a 
function of asset beta and leverage, a series of negative abnormal returns will 
increase the equity beta thus increasing the expected return on the stock, provided 
the firm does not alter it’s capital structure.  Therefore any subsequent changes in 
price would be larger than predicted in the absence of such a change in risk.  
Likewise, past winners become less risky since the past increases in the market 
value of equity cause the debt-equity ratios to decline. 
 
Chan (1988) contends that if the beta estimates were updated throughout the 
analysis, the so-called evidence of overreaction as per De Bondt and Thaler would 
merely be consistent with rational investor behaviour whereby the pattern of returns 
varies as a result of changes in risk.  Chan tests this risk change hypothesis by 
incorporating changes in beta over time and finds that the losers’ betas increase 
after a period of abnormal loss, and the winners’ betas decrease after a period of 
abnormal gain.  Overall, he finds that the formation-to-test beta change is -.222 for 
the winners and .231 for the loser portfolios. 
 
Confirmatory evidence is presented by Ball and Kothari (1989), who although using a 
different methodology, find that by allowing time varying expected returns the 
arbitrage strategy yields insignificant abnormal returns.  In fact, they show more 
severe changes in betas, between the formation period and the test period, than 
those observed by Chan.  Given the extent of the change in risk Chan concludes that 
‘if our risk adjustment is appropriate and adequate, we find only weak evidence of 
price reversals, even though the stocks in our sample have experienced very large 
abnormal gains or losses prior to the test period’ (p.160). 
                                                                                                                                            
them a year would have earned a twenty-one-year annual average abnormal return of -55.8 percent” 
(p.247). 
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Much of the subsequent debate has concentrated on the joint impact of changes in 
risk and company size.  Zarowin (1989, 1990) takes issue with De Bondt and Thaler 
on the basis of the size of the companies in the winner and loser portfolios.  He 
argues that the overreaction effect is limited to smaller and lesser-known companies 
and accordingly is a reflection of the ‘size effect’ as observed by Banz (1981) and 
others.5  When losers are matched against winners of equal size the monthly 
abnormal returns decline to negligible levels.  Therefore, market efficiency is still 
thought to hold for larger companies (Dissanaike, 1997). 
 
As a direct result of these issues, De Bondt and Thaler (1987) tested, using their 
original sample, whether after adjustment the overreaction effect disappears.  In 
contrast to their initial results, they found that the past losers’ betas were now larger 
than the past winners betas.  Although this weakened the strength of their previous 
arguments, the change in risk was not sufficient to explain the abnormal 
performance of past losers over past winners.  The authors also investigated the 
influence of other related anomalies on the overreaction hypothesis.  By comparing 
the market values and asset rankings across all portfolio formations, they find that 
although there is some evidence of skewness, the winner and loser portfolios are not 
dominated by a particular firm size.  Thus the winner-loser effect cannot be 
described as a small firm phenomenon.6  Furthermore, as De Bondt and Thaler 
(1989) note while there is by necessity a mechanical link between prior performance 
and firm size it is unlikely that the firms in the loser portfolios in their original work are 
small enough for the ‘small firm’ effect to explain the abnormal performance. 
 
A more direct means of assessing the impact of company size is provided in 
Dissanaike (1997) who test for reversal using a sample of 1,000 of the larger and 
better known UK companies.  This sample minimises biases caused by bid-ask 
effects and infrequent trading and also reduces the possibility that reversals are 
primarily a small-firm phenomenon.  Using holding period returns to calculate 
abnormal returns, he finds evidence largely consistent with the overreaction 
hypothesis.  Also differential risk did not seem to be a possible explanation. 
 
In a strong rebuttal of the risk change hypothesis, Chopra et al. (1992), using an 
empirically determined price of beta risk, find that after adjusting for risk changes 
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 The ‘size effect’ concerns the observation that the risk adjusted returns of small firms is greater than 
the returns from large firms. 
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extreme losers outperform extreme winners.  Furthermore, based on evidence of 
overreaction around the time of earnings announcement, the authors point out time-
varying risk patterns cannot completely explain the overreaction effect.  This 
observation, combined with evidence of shorter term overreaction, leads to the 
conclusion that compensation for changes in risk cannot wholly explain the 
‘overreaction effect’.  In addition, they argue that the methods used by others to 
adjust for size is inappropriate as they typically introduce a bias against finding an 
independent overreaction effect.  In direct tests after adjusting for size, but not 
changes in risk, they find significant differences in performance.  However, the 
authors still find the existence of a size effect in some form, which they attempt to 
explain by the shareholder make-up of small and large firms.7  They argue that 
because shareholders in small firms are typically private client type investors who are 
less sophisticated / more nervous than institutional type investors, there is a 
tendency for prices in small firms to be more volatile than larger firms. 
 
Finally, the results of De Bondt and Thaler have also been questioned as the 
majority of the excess returns are earned in January and as such the findings may 
be a reflection of the ‘January effect’.  A ‘turn-of-year effect’ has been documented 
for most major stock markets (Gultekin and Gultekin, 1983).  The ‘small firm effect’ is 
often linked to the ‘January effect’ as most of the excess returns to small firms 
appears to occur in January (Keim, 1983).  
 
Several explanations have been put forward as to why the January effect exists, the 
most popular of which is the tax-loss selling hypothesis.  This argues that stocks 
experiencing large price declines are likely candidates for tax-loss selling at the end 
of the tax year to offset capital gains made elsewhere.  In most countries the tax year 
ends in December implying that loss-making shares are sold heavily in December 
(causing the price to fall) and subsequently repurchased heavily in January (causing 
the price to rise), resulting in an abnormally high return in the month of January.  It is 
also suggested that the pattern of returns for small firms is strongly associated with 
tax-loss selling as empirically their returns show the greatest volatility and as such 
would be more prone to this type of transaction (Roll, 1982).  Empirical evidence, 
although not wholly conclusive, seems to support this hypothesis.  For example, 
Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) found that for all countries with a January to December 
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 Similar results are noted in Albert and Henderson (1995) and others. 
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tax year, January returns are significantly larger than all other months.  However, in 
the UK where the tax year starts in April, January still remained the best performing 
month.  Similarly, in respect of Ireland, which also has an April tax year, both 
Donnelly (1991) and Kearney (1996) find that January offers the highest return. This 
would imply that apart from tax-loss selling other factors may influence the January 
effect. 
 
Potentially there exists a link between taxation motivated transactions and the 
seasonal patterns observed in empirical studies of the overreaction effect.  For loser 
stocks the excess returns in January would be broadly consistent with tax loss selling 
due to their prior performance.  For winner shares the reversal may reflect what De 
Bondt and Thaler (1987) term the ‘the capital gains tax lock-in effect’.  Here the 
reverse argument applies.  Investors will be unwilling to sell shares that have 
performed well on the market as the sale would lead to a higher capital gains tax 
liability.  This reduction in supply leads to an increase in share price in December, 
however as potential tax worries dissipate in January supply increases and price 
falls. 
 
Some evidence exists that the returns from the overreaction effect based contrarian 
strategy are linked to stock market seasonality.  For example, Zarowin (1990) finds 
that once winner and loser shares are matched on the basis of firm size, all of the 
excess returns occur in January.  Therefore he argues the anomaly is a reflection of 
the ‘size’ and ‘January effects’.  Chopra et al. (1992) also find that a disproportionate 
amount of the excess returns are earned in January.  However regression analysis 
indicates it to be independent of a tax-loss selling effect.  De Bondt and Thaler 
(1987) indicate that the overreaction and January effects are acting in tandem to 
explain the share price reversal at the beginning of the year for losers.  However, 
their earlier work has highlighted one very important flaw with the tax-loss selling 
hypothesis as a complete explanation of the overreaction effect.  Namely, why do 
prices rebound for losers by a greater magnitude than the price decline induced by 
the selling pressure?  And also why do losers continue to rebound in subsequent 
Januaries, even after periods of outperforming the market? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
7
 While overreaction is present in all groups, it is stronger for smaller companies, with extreme losers 
outperforming extreme winners by about 10% per year. 
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Furthermore, as a higher proportion of overall returns are earned in January, the 
evidence that loser firms earn a significant proportion of their excess returns in 
January does not provide a complete explanation of the overreaction effect (Clare 
and Thomas, 1995).  Thus as De Bondt and Thaler (1987) note “Many puzzles 
remain, especially regarding the seasonality in excess returns.  We have no 
satisfactory explanation, for the January effects, rational or otherwise” (p.579).  
Overall, they conclude that despite these puzzles the returns of winning and losing 
firms show reversal patterns that are consistent with overreaction. 
 
2.3.  International Evidence 
So far much of the debate has concentrated on studies using US data, however the 
‘overreaction effect’ has also been examined in a range of other international stock 
markets.  Studies in the UK have found strong evidence that the arbitrage strategy 
can lead to significant excess returns.  Power et al. (1991) show that over a five year 
test-period the loser and winner portfolios yield an average cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) of 86% and minus 47% respectively.  The performance of the UK 
arbitrage strategy falls significantly when the influence of changes in risk is taken into 
consideration.  When adjusted the average CAR of the loser portfolio falls to just 
under 20% while the average CAR of the winner portfolio rises to slightly below 
zero.8 
 
Another study of the UK market, MacDonald and Power (1991), tests for 
overreaction using eight 3 year test periods and find that the arbitrage strategy 
earned an average CAR of 30%.  Clare and Thomas (1995) also find some evidence 
of overreaction in the UK for the period 1955-1990 with losers outperforming winners 
by a statistically significant 1.7% per annum.  As they observe, this should be 
considered an upper bound as a potential survivorship bias exists as a result of the 
requirement that firms exist over the entire horizon periods examined.  However, 
similar to Zarowin (1990), when firm size is controlled for there is no evidence of 
abnormal returns. 
 
                                                 
8
 Interestingly, the authors track six financial characteristics of the winner and loser portfolios during 
the formation and test periods.  They find that although the winner firms outperform their loser 
counterparts over both periods in absolute terms, relatively speaking, the loser firms experience a more 
dramatic increase in profitability and growth. The subject of mean reversion in accounting ratios as an 
explanation of the overreaction effect is not directly addressed in this study.  For a review of some of 
the evidence in this regard see Forbes (1996) or Power and Lonie (1993). 
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In general other international evidence offer mixed but mostly supportive evidence 
for the anomaly.  For example, Stock (1990), Alonso and Rubio (1990), Wang et al. 
(1997) and Da Costa (1994) find significant evidence of reversals in returns 
consistent with overreaction in the German, Spanish, Far Eastern and Brazilian 
markets respectively.  Some contradictory evidence is provided on the Australian 
market by Brailsford (1992) who finds no evidence consistent with reversal.9  Also 
Kryanowski and Zhang (1992) find statistically insignificant reversal in returns in the 
Canadian market. 
 
A number of observations with regard to the international studies reviewed are 
noteworthy.  First, several of the studies show continuation in performance over 
shorter time periods (Stock (1990), Kryanowski and Zhang (1992), Brailsford (1992)).  
Second, none of the studies find that seasonality, size or changes in risk significantly 
alter the results.  Third, Wang et al. (1997) find that winners contribute more to the 
arbitrage strategy than losers, whereas Da Costa (1994) and Alfonso and Rubio 
(1990) find a symmetrical pattern to the results.  Finally,  Da Costa (1994) notes that 
while his results are significant over all time periods, during periods of extreme 
market volatility the abnormal performance is more pronounced.  This concurs with 
Wang et al. (1997) who argue that the extreme levels of abnormal performance they 
observe are due to Far Eastern markets being more volatile than their western 
counterparts.10 
 
Thus we can see that while evidence for the existence of the overreaction effect is 
widespread, the results differ in a number of regards.  Methodological differences 
invariably play a part in explaining how such differences can arise.  Indeed, as Ball 
and Kothari (1989) note, considerable care needs to be taken when constructing 
appropriate research designs.  However, the characteristics of the individual markets 
can also bear some influence. 
 
The evidence of reversals in stock returns fits with more general evidence of 
predictability in both index and individual stock returns (see for example, Fama and 
French, 1989; Jegadeesh, 1990; and Campbell, Lo and McKinlay (1997) for a 
review).  Proterba and Summers (1988) investigate whether prices are mean 
                                                 
9
 While the winners subsequently underperform the market by 69.6%, the losers continue as losers and 
underperform by 52.6%. 
10
 They report that over 36 months the arbitrage strategy yields 151.33%, 184.81% and 89.01% for 
Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong respectively. 
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reverting in 18 countries.  They find that most of the countries tested display negative 
serial correlation at long horizons.  Interestingly, in light of the argument presented in 
Chopra et al (1992), they state that there “is some tendency for more mean reversion 
in less broad-based and sophisticated equity markets” (pg. 45). 
 
The existence or not of the reversal phenomenon is still open to question.  
Furthermore, where studies have found evidence of such an effect, the degree to 
which the effect can be explained by other market anomalies or rational adjustments 
to other factors is open to debate.  The remainder of this paper examines these 
issues in the context of the Irish equity market in an attempt to add to the growing 
body of international evidence. 
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology applied in this paper differs from standard event studies as no 
single company specific event is identified (such as an earnings announcement) 
which potentially causes the value of a sample of stocks to change. Here we are only 
concerned with examining (i) stocks which have had significant abnormal returns and 
(ii) the direction and extent of any subsequent return.  Indeed, in the case of the 
overreaction hypothesis, the sample of firms examined during the testing period 
cannot be determined until the portfolio formation period is actually observed. 
 
Several aspects of the nature of the overreaction hypothesis and the design of this 
study are worthy of note.  First, the hypothesis is concerned principally with ‘extreme’ 
rather than general movements in stock prices.  It is not preoccupied with secular 
trends in stock markets but in trends driving the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ performing stocks. 
Second, consideration is given only to historic returns data with no use of other 
information.  In this regard, overreaction is a test of weak-form efficiency.  Third, no 
specific time frame for the returns reversal to occur is immediately suggested.  That 
is, the price change interval could be several days or several years.  Fourth, no 
formal ‘overreaction model’ exists.  The hypothesis does not attempt to 
mathematically “explain” the excess volatility in stock prices; it only attempts to prove 
its existence and offer a heuristic explanation.  The approach in some ways 
resembles tests of filter rules, in which a trading strategy is specified to see if it 
works.  However, the overreaction strategy is more than a simple ad hoc trading 
strategy.  With an ad hoc trading strategy, the only concern is whether or not the 
strategy is profitable net of transaction costs.  I
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based on an actual hypothesis, i.e. that individuals tend to overreact to important 
information.  Finally, as has been noted, a number of alternative theories have been 
suggested as to why overreaction by investors might arise.  This paper does not 
attempt to differentiate between the various psychological or institutional 
explanations but rather is concerned with whether their is evidence of returns 
reversal in the Irish equity market. 
 
Stock price data for all firms quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange, except those listed 
on the Exploration Securities Market, was taken from the Datastream database for 
the period 1979 - 1996.11  The 18 year period used here is comparable in length to 
other studies (e.g. Stock,1990; Alonso and Rubio, 1990).  In line with De Bondt and 
Thaler, the number of stocks in the sample varies over the time period.  There is 
currently over 80 companies listed on the main Irish market.  This is significantly 
lower than most of the other major exchanges and restricts the data to a relatively 
small sample.  Furthermore, of the stocks currently quoted, only 22 have data dating 
back to 1979.  Thus, the early horizon periods are based on a smaller sample than 
the later periods. 
 
Rather than using the ISEQ index or a similar index as a proxy for market returns, an 
equally weighted index was constructed to proxy for the market index.  It was felt that 
an equally weighted index would be more appropriate in this study for a number of 
reasons. First, Brown and Warner (1980) found that using an equally weighted index 
leads to more powerful tests than using a value-weighted index.  Specifically, they 
show that the use of a value weighted index can erroneously reject the null 
hypothesis of no abnormal performance and also that the use of an equally weighted 
index is more likely to pick up abnormal performance when it exists.  Second, given 
the nature of the Irish market, value weighted indices such as the ISEQ or the 
Goodbody Index are heavily weighted towards specific stocks or sectors.  For 
example, the financial sector accounts for approximately one third of the total market 
while the top 10 stocks account for over two thirds of total capitalisation.  Hence the 
market index can be unduly influenced by particular companies or sectors. 
 
The equally weighted index was calculated by arithmetically averaging the returns of 
those stocks that are included in the initial database and therefore the index will not 
                                                 
11
  Specifically, the total returns index for each company was extracted, which incorporates dividends 
and capital events in calculating total returns. 
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wholly represent the market return over the sample period.12  However, the stocks 
that are included in this sample are primarily those that would have been the 
principal drivers of the market over the 18 year period under investigation. 
Admittedly, this index will be survival biased since the firms that make up the index 
(by definition) survive the period.  It is therefore possible that if delisted firms are 
characterised by inferior performance, the equally weighted index will be biased 
upwards.  Furthermore, as Brailsford (1988) highlights, the market returns from the 
use of an equally weighted index may be biased upwards due to the abnormally high 
returns of smaller companies.  Given that such a firm size effect  has been observed 
in the Irish Stock Market (Colgan; 1988; McKillop and Hutchinson,1988) we would 
expect the observed returns to exceed the ‘true’ returns.  These taken together have 
the potential to reduce (increase) the possibility of finding a reversal in performance 
for the loser (winner) firms.  The overall extent/direction of the bias is impossible to 
ascertain but it is possibly neutral as regards an arbitrage portfolio. 
 
The methodology used to capture the overreaction effect is adopted from that used 
by De Bondt and Thaler in testing for the existence of overreaction in the US stock 
market.  The abnormal returns are calculated based on a market adjusted (zero-one) 
model.  This assumes that the expected return on each stock should equal that of 
the market as a whole, i.e. E(Rjt) = E(Rmt).  Abnormal returns are thus calculated as 
the actual difference between the returns on the stock and the market in any month, 
t. 
 
    U R Rjt jt mt= −  
where: 
Ujt   = the market adjusted abnormal return of stock j in month t 
Rjt   = the return of stock j in month t 
Rmt    = the return on the equally weighted index in month t 
 
By using this model no attempt is made to specify which is the correct asset pricing 
model for generating abnormal returns.13   Thus, effectively this study concentrates 
more on testing market efficiency rather than a joint hypothesis of whether market 
                                                 
12
 Brailsford (1988) and Da Costa (1994) use a similar technique to proxy market returns in the 
Australian and Brazilian Markets respectively. 
13
 Thus the abnormal results presented in the next section reflect the excess return over the market as a 
whole with no specific adjustment for risk.  As such they represent ‘trading profits’ from exploiting the 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No 38 
16 
efficiency and a specific asset pricing model explain returns in the Irish market.  Also, 
as demonstrated by Brown and Warner (1980), mean-adjusted and market-adjusted 
models perform as well as more complex models in correctly identifying abnormal 
performance.14 
 
The effect was tested for over horizon periods of two years, four years and six years 
duration.  In the case of two year horizon periods, it was possible to run seventeen 
tests for overreaction.  For each separate test, the horizon period is equally split 
between the formation period and the testing period.  For example, the first test in 
the two year horizon period will use data for the period 1979-1980.  Data for 1979 
was used to form the winner-loser portfolios while data for 1980 was used to test for 
any subsequent reversal in abnormal returns and so on.  For four and six year 
horizon periods, it was possible to run eight and five non-overlapping tests for 
overreaction respectively. 
 
We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each stock over the various 
formation periods, as follows: 
    CAR Uj jt
t
T
=
=
∑
1
 
Various studies of overreaction have used a number of different methods to assign 
firms to the winner and loser portfolios.  For example, De Bondt and Thaler specify 
the best 35, 50 or top 10% stocks (i.e. those with the greatest abnormal returns) as 
winners and the worst 35, 50 or bottom 10% stocks as losers.  The approach taken 
here is more straightforward and involves specifying the top 15% performers as 
winners and the bottom 15% as losers.  A 10% figure was considered too low as 
given the size of the overall sample, the winner and loser portfolios would be 
extremely small. 
 
Having formed winner and loser portfolios, we calculate the monthly abnormal 
returns for each portfolio for each month over the testing periods as 
    AR
U
n
k
kt
n
n
=
=
∑
1
 
                                                                                                                                            
suggested strategies over and above market returns, before transaction costs.  As will be noted below 
the results were also estimated using a risk-adjusted market model. 
14
 In fact they note that when securities are not randomly selected and sample security systematic risk 
estimates are systematically clustered simpler models are superior to an explicit risk adjustment. 
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where: n = number of firms in portfolio 
 k = the winner (W) and loser (L) portfolios respectively 
 
The abnormal returns for each portfolio were then cumulated over the entire test 
period, T 
    CAR ARk k
t
T
=
=
∑
1
 
Having calculated the CAR for the winner and loser portfolios over each test period 
we compute the average cumulative abnormal return, (ACAR), for the winner and 
loser portfolios. 
    ACAR
CAR
P
k
k
p
P
=
=
∑
1
 
where:  P = number of test periods 
 
We also compute the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACARWL) for an 
arbitrage portfolio (which corresponds to buying the loser portfolio and selling the 
winner portfolio) as 
 
    ACAR ACAR ACARWL L W= −  
 
Formally, if market efficiency holds, then: 
 
HO:  ACAR ACAR ACARWL L W= = = 0  
If not then: 
HA:  ACARW < 0  
HB:  ACARL > 0  
HC:  ACARWL > 0  
 
The null hypothesis states that an individual should not earn excess returns by 
investing in a portfolio of past loser stocks and short selling a portfolio of past winner 
stocks, as past return patterns give no indication as to future return prospects. In 
accordance with the EMH, this implies that the expected abnormal return for both the 
loser and winner portfolios is zero.  The alternative hypothesis predicts ACARL to be 
greater than zero, ACARW to be less than zero and the combination of the two to be 
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positive.  In other words, since past losers should outperform past winners the null 
hypothesis would be rejected. 
 
The following test statistic was used to formally test the first two hypotheses, HA and 
HB 
   t
ACAR
S N
k
=
/
 
where:   S = sample standard deviation 
   N= sample size 
The test statistic for the third hypothesis, HC, is given by the formula: 
    t
ACAR
S N
WL
WL
=
2 2 /
 
where:  SWL is the standard deviation of the pooled sample (and both 
samples are of equal size (N)) 
 
One potential source of bias with respect to the returns for the test period portfolios 
comes from the requirement that only companies still listed on the Irish Stock 
Exchange are included in the sample.  This form of survivorship bias, with 
companies who delisted being excluded, may result in firms who would potentially 
have been classified as loser firms continuing to underperform and eventually failing.  
By excluding these companies the test period returns for loser portfolios are 
potentially biased upwards. On the other hand, as Power et al. (1991) highlight, 
delistings can also occur due to mergers or acquisitions.  Since well-documented 
evidence exists that the majority of companies subject to takeover are characterised 
by low growth, poor profitability and even financial distress, most would also have 
conceivably been included in the loser portfolio(s).  Moreover, as significant 
premiums generally accrue to target firms, the exclusion of firms delisting due to 
takeover could lead to a downward bias in estimated loser portfolio returns.  
Therefore it is difficult to ascertain the direction of survivorship bias introduced by the 
data requirements imposed. 
 
One of the strongest methodological criticisms of De Bondt and Thaler’s original 
study, and therefore implicitly of this study, is presented in Conrad and Kaul (1993).  
The authors argue that the results found in De Bondt and Thaler and other studies of 
contrarian investment strategies are biased upwards as a result of cumulating single-
period (monthly) returns over long periods.  Not only are the ‘true’ returns cumulated 
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but also measurement errors, due to non-synchronous trading, price discreteness 
and most importantly bid-ask errors, are cumulated.15  Using holding period returns, 
rather than cumulative abnormal returns, they document a reduction in the excess 
returns on the arbitrage portfolio.  When January returns are excluded they find no 
evidence of overreaction.  Furthermore, using regression analysis they show that the 
excess returns in January are a reflection of excess returns to low-price stocks with 
little connection to past performance.   
 
Lougrhan and Ritter (1995) take issue with the statistical methodology employed by 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) and argue that their results are primarily due to a 
confounding of cross-sectional patterns and aggregate time-series mean reversion.  
Secondly, they argue that a survivorship bias is introduced  These procedures, they 
argue, increase the influence of price at the expense of prior returns.  They also 
suggest that the cumulative abnormal returns technique does not does not benefit 
from compounding, which would increase the ‘true’ returns from investing in the 
arbitrage portfolio.16  Furthermore, they argue that as price is a direct proxy for prior 
returns it is exceptionally difficult to definitively say which is connected to the 
subsequent excess returns.  Their study, using a different methodology to control for 
these factors, provides direct evidence that the use of cumulative abnormal returns 
instead of buy and hold returns does not drive De Bondt and Thaler’s results. 
 
In addition, it is by no means certain that this methodological criticism applies in the 
context of an Irish study of overreaction.  As Power and Lonie (1993) note the 
problem of bid-ask spreads should not be as serious for tests of long-run 
overreaction since recording errors are less likely to occur in low-frequency data 
such as the monthly returns employed in this study.  They also note that several 
sources of bias may offset rather than reinforce each other.  Finally, the criticism 
may not apply to studies using data drawn from Datastream, which uses mid-market 
share prices and therefore is not subject to the same bid-ask bias as US data.  This 
is supported by Power et al. (1991) who find more impressive results for an arbitrage 
portfolio using buy and hold returns than the portfolio using cumulative abnormal 
returns.  Similarly Dissanaike (1997) documents significant overreaction using 
holding period returns. 
                                                 
15
 Dissanaike (1994) provides a similar argument although it is by no means clear from his study the 
direction of the potential bias. 
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Table 1 summarises the extent of the overreaction effect in the Irish equity market 
for each of the three horizon periods.17  As can be seen, the strategy of buying 
extreme losers and short selling extreme winners in the two year horizon period is 
not significant but instead leads to an average loss of 1.9%.  In the case of the four 
year period, the profitability of the strategy increases substantially to 24.2% while in 
the six year period this declines marginally to 23.0%. 
 
Table 1:  Profitability of Arbitrage Strategy over Three Horizon Periods 
 
Horizon Period Profitability of Arbitrage Strategy 
2 Years -1.9% 
4 Years 24.2% 
(1.67) 6 Years 23.0% 
(1.52) 
 
The evidence shows that while the extent of overreaction is negligible in the two year 
horizon period, it is certainly evident in the other two horizon periods.  This is 
consistent with much of the existing international evidence.  
 
The results for the arbitrage strategy are not statistically significant at normal 
confidence levels.  However, given the extent of the profitability of the strategy in the 
longer horizon periods, the economic significance of the results cannot be ignored.  
Before a more detailed analysis can be carried out as to the exact nature of 
overreaction in the Irish equity market, a detailed description of the results found for 
each of the horizon periods is provided. 
 
Table 2 details the extent of the overreaction effect over a two year horizon period 
and is divided into 3 sections. Table 2a presents the cumulative abnormal returns for 
the loser portfolio for the each of the formation and testing periods.  Table 2b does 
the same for the winner portfolios, while Table 2c presents the profitability of the 
arbitrage strategy.  The average CARs for each of the winner and loser portfolios are 
based on a total of 17 formation and test periods.  The number of stocks that make 
                                                                                                                                            
16
 Interestingly, they reinforce this argument by using evidence that  studies of mean reversion, without 
recourse to performance, show higher reversal over 5 years than those detailed in De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985). 
17
 The results were also estimated using a risk-adjusted market model.  Apart from a reduction in the 
excess return for losers in the 6 year horizon period, the results are similar to those reported for the 
market-adjusted returns.  A copy of these results are available from the authors on request. 
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up the winner and loser portfolios varies for each horizon period and increases from 
3 stocks in 1979-80 to 7 stocks in 1995-96.18 
 
Table 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns based on a Two Year Horizon Period 
 
Table 2a: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Loser Portfolios Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Two Year Horizon Period 
Formation period CAR (Losers) Testing Period Subsequent CAR 
(Losers) 
CAR '79 -0.3382 CAR '80 -0.0281 
CAR '80 -0.5153 CAR '81 0.2066 
CAR '81 -0.3548 CAR '82 -0.0819 
CAR '82 -0.2953 CAR '83 0.5123 
CAR '83 -0.6529 CAR '84 0.0806 
CAR '84 -0.3921 CAR '85 -0.0791 
CAR '85 -0.3473 CAR '86 -0.2183 
CAR '86 -0.6638 CAR '87 0.1752 
CAR '87 -0.5041 CAR '88 0.0111 
CAR '88 -0.4831 CAR '89 -0.0374 
CAR '89 -0.6261 CAR '90 -0.0693 
CAR '90 -0.5049 CAR '91 -0.2344 
CAR '91 -0.6629 CAR '92 0.0296 
CAR '92 -0.4058 CAR '93 0.0519 
CAR '93 -0.4641 CAR '94 0.3036 
CAR '94 -0.4032 CAR '95 -0.1297 
CAR '95 -0.4720 CAR '96 -0.0475 
Mean -0.4756  0.0262 
t Stat   0.5732 
                                                 
18
 The number of stocks in each of the winner and loser is comparable to many of the international 
studies.  For example, Wang et al. (1997) and Alonso and Rubio (1990) use an average of five stocks 
while Stock (1990) selects his portfolios based on three stocks.  Appendix 1 details the exact number of 
stocks for each horizon period. 
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Table 2b: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Winner Portfolios Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Two Year Horizon Period 
Formation period CAR (Winners) Testing Period Subsequent CAR 
(Winners) 
CAR '79 0.37155 CAR '80 0.3480 
CAR '80 0.64922 CAR '81 -0.0551 
CAR '81 0.49003 CAR '82 0.2241 
CAR '82 0.42582 CAR '83 -0.0955 
CAR '83 0.71280 CAR '84 -0.1578 
CAR '84 0.54491 CAR '85 -0.0594 
CAR '85 0.58426 CAR '86 0.1085 
CAR '86 1.19822 CAR '87 -0.1693 
CAR '87 0.41557 CAR '88 -0.1022 
CAR '88 0.47125 CAR '89 0.0545 
CAR '89 0.56267 CAR '90 0.2277 
CAR '90 0.53228 CAR '91 0.2597 
CAR '91 0.54500 CAR '92 -0.0127 
CAR '92 0.35750 CAR '93 -0.0649 
CAR '93 0.38483 CAR '94 0.0465 
CAR '94 0.50566 CAR '95 0.1433 
CAR '95 0.35839 CAR '96 0.0766 
Mean 0.5359  0.0454 
t Stat   1.2100 
 
Table 2c: Arbitrage Strategy Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Two Year Horizon Period 
Testing Period CAR of Losers CAR of Winners Arbitrage Strategy 
 
CAR '80 -0.0281 0.3480 -0.3761 
CAR '81 0.2066 -0.0551 0.2618 
CAR '82 -0.0819 0.2241 -0.3060 
CAR '83 0.5123 -0.0955 0.6079 
CAR '84 0.0806 -0.1578 0.2384 
CAR '85 -0.0791 -0.0594 -0.0197 
CAR '86 -0.2183 0.1085 -0.3268 
CAR '87 0.1752 -0.1693 0.3445 
CAR '88 0.0111 -0.1022 0.1133 
CAR '89 -0.0374 0.0545 -0.0919 
CAR '90 -0.0693 0.2277 -0.2969 
CAR '91 -0.2344 0.2597 -0.4941 
CAR '92 0.0296 -0.0127 0.0422 
CAR '93 0.0519 -0.0649 0.1168 
CAR '94 0.3036 0.0465 0.2571 
CAR '95 -0.1297 0.1433 -0.2729 
CAR '96 -0.0475 0.0766 -0.1241 
Mean 0.0262 0.0454 -0.0192 
t Stat   -0.3247 
Note: t Stats not significant   
 
The results show that the cumulative abnormal return of the loser portfolios, CARL,  
and the winner portfolios, CARW, are substantially different in the formation period: 
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the losers on average underperform the market index by 47.6% while the winners 
outperform by 53.6%. This divergence narrows substantially during the test periods 
due to a turnaround in the performance of these portfolios. For both winners and 
losers, the results show a reversal of some degree in every test period.  The loser 
portfolios show reversal with an average abnormal return of 2.6%.  However, the 
winner portfolios continue to remain winners, implying a loss of 4.5% on the short 
selling strategy. 
 
As these results may be driven by very extreme market behaviour during a relatively 
small part of the sample period, it is worth investigating the subperiods to see if the 
mean CAR is overly influenced by specific years.  In the case of CARL, nine of the 
seventeen portfolios remain losers with the most extreme period being 1991 with a 
loss of 23%.  The highest reversal in CARL occurred in 1983 at a level of 51%.  With 
regard to CARW, nine of the seventeen portfolios remained winners with the most 
extreme period being 1980 when this portfolio continued to win a further 35%.  The 
best performing winner portfolio (from the perspective of the short seller) was in 1984 
when a reversal of 15% occurred.  Generally, however, it can be noted that no 
specific test period exerted an overt influence on the average CAR for both the 
winners and losers. 
 
The net position of the arbitrage strategy is a loss of 1.9%.  This is due to the 
average continuation in performance of the winners, as the loss on the short-selling 
position outweighs the marginal gain from buying past losers.  However, it should be 
noted that the arbitrage strategy yielded positive returns in eight of the test periods. 
 
Table 3 presents evidence for the existence of the overreaction effect over a four 
year horizon period.  This is based on eight formation and testing samples, with the 
number of stocks in each winner and loser portfolio again rising from three to seven 
stocks over the period. 
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Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns based on a Four Year Horizon Period 
Table 3a: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Loser Portfolios Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Four Year Horizon Period 
Formation period CAR (Losers) Testing Period Subsequent CAR 
(Losers) 
CAR '79-'80 -0.4491 CAR '81-'82 -0.0844 
CAR '81-'82 -0.5933 CAR '83-'84 0.9288 
CAR '83-'84 -0.7109 CAR '85-'86 -0.0033 
CAR '85-'86 -0.8421 CAR '87-'88 0.2001 
CAR '87-'88 -0.6529 CAR '89-'90 0.1406 
CAR '89-'90 -0.9331 CAR '91-'92 -0.1419 
CAR '91-'92 -0.8463 CAR '93-'94 0.3541 
CAR '93-'94 -0.4649 CAR '95-'96 -0.1284 
Mean -0.6866  0.1582 
t Stat   1.2540 
    
Table 3b: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Winner Portfolios Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Four Year Horizon Period 
Formation period CAR (Winners) Testing Period Subsequent CAR 
(Winners) 
CAR '79-'80 0.7999 CAR '81-'82 -0.2467 
CAR '81-'82 0.7141 CAR '83-'84 -0.1749 
CAR '83-'84 0.8188 CAR '85-'86 -0.3729 
CAR '85-'86 0.8208 CAR '87-'88 0.2563 
CAR '87-'88 0.6437 CAR '89-'90 -0.0612 
CAR '89-'90 0.8746 CAR '91-'92 -0.0823 
CAR '91-'92 0.6797 CAR '93-'94 -0.1141 
CAR '93-'94 0.6301 CAR '95-'96 0.1257 
Mean 0.7477  -0.0837 
t Stat   -1.1857 
    
Table 3c: Arbitrage Strategy Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Four Year Horizon Period 
Testing Period CAR of Losers CAR of Winners Arbitrage Strategy 
CAR '81-'82 -0.0844 -0.2467 0.1622 
CAR '83-'84 0.9288 -0.1749 1.1038 
CAR '85-'86 -0.0033 -0.3729 0.3696 
CAR '87-'88 0.2001 0.2563 -0.0562 
CAR '89-'90 0.1406 -0.0612 0.2019 
CAR '91-'92 -0.1419 -0.0823 -0.0596 
CAR '93-'94 0.3541 -0.1141 0.4681 
CAR '95-'96 -0.1284 0.1257 -0.2541 
Mean 0.1582 -0.0837 0.2420 
t Stat   1.6734 
Note: t Stats not significant   
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The average CAR for the winner and loser portfolios during the formation period 
comes to 75% and minus 69% respectively.  This is higher than in the two year 
horizon period and is hardly surprising given the longer period for which abnormal 
returns are allowed to accumulate.  Again a reversal trend can be witnessed for all 
portfolios as we move from the formation period to the test period.  In the case of the 
loser portfolios, four of the eight show a subsequent positive CAR.  Because the 
extent of these positive returns is much higher than that of the portfolios that remain 
losers, the average CARL comes to 15.8%.  Noticeably, the test period 1983-84 
makes a strong contribution to the overall positive return of the loser portfolios with a 
CAR of 92.9%.  If this period had been neutral (i.e. CAR = 0) the average CAR would 
have fallen to a less substantial figure of 4.8%. 
 
In the case of the winner portfolios, six of the eight test periods show a turnabout in 
returns indicating a more comprehensive trend for winners to revert over a four year 
horizon period.  The extent of this reversal varies from minus 37% to minus 6% and 
averages at an overall figure of minus 8.4%.  The net result from selling winners and 
buying losers is a positive average CAR of 24.2%, with five of the eight test periods 
being profitable.  Loser portfolios contribute almost twice as much to the overall 
position as the winners, implying an asymmetric pattern in returns. 
 
Table 4 presents the evidence for overreaction over a six year horizon and is 
comprised of five sample periods.  In the case of losers, the reversal in returns from 
the formation period to the test period is again significant, rising from a loss of 90.4% 
to a profit of 16.6%.  Four of the five subsequent CARs of loser portfolios during the 
test period are positive while the exception is only mildly negative at 3.6%. 
 
Winners also display a strong reversal in returns over the formation and testing 
periods, declining from 83.3% to minus 6.4%.  However, the subsequent 
performance of the winner portfolios during the test periods are more volatile than 
their loser counterparts.  Three of the five portfolios continue to remain winners in the 
testing period, albeit two at relatively low levels.  It is only due to the extent of the 
reversal of the two reverting portfolios that the average CAR of winners is negative 
overall. 
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Table 4: Cumulative Abnorma Returns based on a Six Year Horizon Period 
Table 4a: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Loser Portfolios Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Six Year Horizon Period 
Formation period CAR (Losers) Testing Period Subsequent 
CAR(Losers) 
CAR '79-'81 -0.6049 CAR '82-'84 0.0866 
CAR '82-'84 -0.8526 CAR '85-'87 0.2972 
CAR '85-'87 -0.8857 CAR '88-'90 0.2085 
CAR '88-'90 -1.1716 CAR '91-'93 -0.0359 
CAR '91-'93 -1.0058 CAR '94-'96 0.2729 
Mean -0.9041  0.1659 
t Stat   2.66* 
    
Table 4b: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Winner Portfolios Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Six Year Horizon Period 
Formation period CAR (Winners) Testing Period Subsequent CAR 
(Winners) 
CAR '79-'81 0.9058 CAR '82-'84 0.3108 
CAR '82-'84 0.6822 CAR '85-'87 -0.4062 
CAR '85-'87 0.8139 CAR '88-'90 0.0894 
CAR '88-'90 0.9407 CAR '91-'93 0.0380 
CAR '91-'93 0.8225 CAR '94-'96 -0.3506 
Mean 0.8330  -0.0637 
t Stat   -0.4661 
    
Table 4c: Arbitrage Strategy Using the 
Market Adjusted Model Based on a Six Year Horizon Period 
Testing Period CAR of Losers 
Testing 
Period (As above) 
CAR of Winners 
Testing 
Period (As above) 
Arbitrage Strategy 
 
CAR '82-'84 0.0866 0.310771422 -0.2241 
CAR '85-'87 0.2972 -0.406188644 0.7034 
CAR '88-'90 0.2085 0.089427792 0.1190 
CAR '91-'93 -0.0359 0.038004854 -0.0739 
CAR '94-'96 0.2729 -0.350566147 0.6234 
Mean 0.1659 -0.063710145 0.2296 
t Stat   1.5285 
* indicates significant t-tests   
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The net profitability of the arbitrage strategy comes to 23.0%.  Again, losers make a 
greater contribution to the strategy accounting for almost three quarters of the total 
return. 
 
The results documented are for the most part statistically insignificant.  The only 
exception being the loser portfolio over the six year horizon period.  However, given 
the strong degree of economic significance it is probable that the relatively small 
sample size explains the lack of statistical significance. 
 
While a direct comparison with results in other countries is not entirely feasible due 
to significant differences in methodologies used, it is worth surveying how this figure 
compares against the international norm.  The Far Eastern markets offer by far the 
most substantial return (Wang et al. (1997)).  If we ignore these markets, the 
average CAR for most other countries is between 15% to 30%.  Thus it would appear 
that the degree of overreaction in the developed markets does not vary substantially 
by country and that the extent of overreaction in the Irish market is not significantly 
different from its Western peers. 
 
Although most studies find evidence of overreaction, as has been previously noted, 
the symmetry of returns from the arbitrage strategy has varied substantially.  The 
findings reported here indicate that losers contribute almost 75% of the average CAR 
over the six year horizon period.  Therefore, the contribution from the various 
portfolios in an Irish context is clearly asymmetrical.  Furthermore, as the length of 
the horizon period increases, the evidence for the presence of overreaction in the 
Irish equity market generally increases.  This is especially so as we move from a two 
year to a four year horizon period.  International studies generally reach the same 
conclusion.  Thus it would appear that the extent of the overreaction effect is heavily 
dependent on the horizon period chosen and that reversion in prices typically takes 
at least 12-24 months.19  The gradual reversal is in line with the psychological 
phenomenon of ‘anchoring’, as discussed in section 2.1. 
 
                                                 
19
 It is interesting to note that in 1959 Benjamin Graham put forward a similar contention, based on his 
observations of market behaviour rather any empirical evidence.  He claimed that “the interval required 
for a substantial undervaluation to correct itself averages 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 years,” (as cited in De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985)). 
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Finally, if as Chen and Sauer (1997) contend a true test of a contrarian strategy is 
that the results are time consistent, then the results presented here clearly fail the 
test.  In each horizon period examined, subperiods existed in which a trading 
strategy based on the overreaction hypothesis would have proved unprofitable.  
However, despite the probability that consistent results would not be available from a 
trading strategy there is evidence of a degree of market inefficiency. 
 
The evidence, presented to date, appears to support the contention that the Irish 
equity market exhibits a pattern of reversal in share returns.  However, as has been 
previously noted, a number of other explanations have been offered which would 
present these results as a reflection of other market anomalies or as a rational 
adjustment to changes in risk.  We therefore turn our attention to the extent to which 
our results can be explained by other factors. 
 
To test for the influence of company size on the results, market capitalisation figures 
for the entire sample were taken from the Datastream database for the period 1979-
1996.  For each year the sample was ranked by company size and grouped into 
quartiles.  Firms ranked in the upper quartile were classified as ‘large firms’ and 
similarly firms within the bottom quartile were designated as ‘small firms’.  The stocks 
that make up the winner and loser portfolios in each period were then examined to 
see if the portfolios are systematically composed of large or small firms.20  This 
procedure was carried out for all three horizon periods.  Table 5 reports the results of 
this analysis over each of the three horizon periods. 
 
In the case of the two year period (Table 5a), there are in total 84 stocks that make 
up the winner and loser portfolios over the 17 test periods.  With regard to loser 
stocks, 40% of the sample are characterised as small, 13% as large and 46% 
intermediate. Winner stocks also show a similar pattern with 31% being small, 19% 
large and 50% intermediate.  Thus we can see that loser portfolio are not 
disproportionately made up of small firms.  Generally, the bulk of stocks that make 
up the winners and losers are predominantly medium sized. 
 
Although the number of observations is lower for the four year horizon period, a 
broadly similar pattern is observed for the make-up of the winner and loser portfolios.  
                                                 
20
 Size is measured at the end of the formation period which is consistent with De Bondt and Thaler 
(1987) and Zarowin (1990). 
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Losers are not totally dominated by small firms, although they account for a more 
substantial 47% of the total.  It is in the six year horizon period that there is a notable 
increase in the number of small firms (57%) that make up the loser portfolios.  At this 
level, it is probable that size differentials, as well as investor overreaction, may be 
responsible for losers outperforming winners in the test period.  Thus, over a six year 
horizon period we cannot rule out the possibility of an influential size effect. 
 
Table 5: Size of Winner and Loser Portfolios over Three Horizon Periods. 
 
Table 5a :  Loser Portfolios based on a 2 year horizon period 
Total Number of Observations 84 % of Total 100% 
Small Firms 34 Small Firms 40% 
Large Firms 11 Large Firms 13% 
Other 39 Other 46% 
  Winner Portfolios based on a 2 year horizon period 
Total Number of Observations 84 % of Total 100% 
Small Firms 26 Small Firms 31% 
Large Firms 16 Large Firms 19% 
Other 42 Other 50% 
 
Table 5b :  Loser Portfolios based on a 4 year horizon period 
Total Number of Observations 38 % of Total 100% 
Small Firms 18 Small Firms 47% 
Large Firms 5 Large Firms 13% 
Other 15 Other 39% 
  Winner Portfolios based on a 4 year horizon period 
Total Number of Observations 38 % of Total 100% 
Small Firms 10 Small firms 26% 
Large Firms 7 Large Firms 18% 
Other 21 Other firms 55% 
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Table 5c :  Loser Portfolios based on a 6 year horizon period 
Total Number of Observations 21 % of Total 100% 
Small Firms 12 Small Firms 57% 
Large Firms 3 Large Firms 14% 
Other 6 Other 29% 
  Winner Portfolios based on a 6 year horizon period 
Total Number of Observations 21 % of Total 100% 
Small Firms 3 Small Firms 14% 
Large Firms 4 Large Firms 19% 
Other 14 Other 67% 
 
The fact that the loser firms are smaller (with respect to market capitalisation) is not 
surprising given the extent of their prior underperformance, as documented in Table 
4.  As a result it is difficult to disentangle the respective influence of the small firm 
effect and a more general tendency towards reversal in share returns.  Of course it is 
possible that the small firm effect is in itself merely a reflection of an overreaction 
effect. 
 
The effect of seasonality is examined by repeating the test procedure for 
overreaction but excluding the month of January from the analysis. This procedure is 
carried out for the six year horizon period.  This was considered the most appropriate 
horizon period as it is the one which is most frequently examined in the literature. 
 
The results in Table 6 show that by excluding this month the profitability of the 
overreaction strategy falls substantially to 9.7%. This indicates that January exerts a 
strong influence on the extent of overreaction.  Nevertheless, there is still a positive 
and substantial difference between the performance of winner and loser portfolios. 
 
Table 6:  The Influence of Seasonality on the Overreaction Effect 
Arbitrage Strategy using a Six Year Horizon Period excluding January 
Testing Period CAR of Losers CAR of Winners Arbitrage Strategy 
CAR '82-'84 -0.2498 0.3141 -0.5640 
CAR '85-'87 0.4506 -0.3077 0.7584 
CAR '88-'90 -0.1116 -0.1602 0.0486 
CAR '91-'93 -0.1938 -0.2081 0.0143 
CAR '94-'96 -0.0107 -0.2394 0.2287 
Mean -0.0231 -0.1203 0.0972 
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When all months are included the losers contribute most to the arbitrage portfolio (as 
per Table 4).  The reverse case arises for the sample exclusive of January where the 
winners now make the more significant contribution (see Table 6).  The results 
clearly show that the losers earn all of their abnormal returns in January and in fact 
underperform the market over the remainder of the year.  Furthermore, the winners 
also outperform the market in January with all of their contribution to the arbitrage 
portfolio being earned in the other 11 months.  While the results for the loser portfolio 
are consistent with the international evidence, the results for the winner portfolio are 
contrary to previous studies. 
 
To some extent, these results support the mounting evidence of seasonality in the 
Irish equity market (McKillop and Hutchinson, 1988; Donnelly, 1991 and Kearney, 
1996).  It is possible that the results presented here are consistent with the tax-loss 
selling hypothesis.  Donnelly (1991) notes that although the tax year end for private 
investors is in April, a significant proportion of the holdings in the Irish Stock Market 
are held by corporate bodies and institutions many of whom have December 
accounting year ends and consequently December tax year ends.  Therefore the 
realisation of loser returns in January could be consistent with tax-loss selling, where 
due to their prior performance the losers would be sold in December and re-bought 
in January.  However, the findings are also broadly consistent with the portfolio 
rebalancing hypothesis, especially due to (as will be noted later) the increasing risk 
of the companies.21 
 
The fact that winners earn all of their positive returns in January is however not 
consistent with De Bondt and Thaler’s ‘capital gains tax lock-in effect’.  It is possible 
that the results may indicate the sale in December of shares which have previously 
gained in value and their subsequent re-purchase in January, to avail of capital gains 
tax allowances.  However, this type of transaction would be more generally 
associated with private investors whose tax year end is in April.  Thus no concrete 
explanation can be offered as to why January has such an influential effect. 
 
                                                 
21
 Ritter and Chopra (1989) suggest the ‘portfolio rebalancing hypothesis’ as a possible explanation for 
the ‘January effect’.  They propose that institutional investors sell off risky stocks at the end of the 
financial year (usually December) so that they are not reported on the balance sheet.  Subsequently 
when  the new year begins these risky stocks are repurchased. 
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To test whether there was a significant change in risk between the formation period 
and the test period, we estimate risk coefficients, using the market model, for each 
share in the respective portfolios for the six-year horizon period.  Table 7 presents 
the results of this analysis.  Consistent with the risk explanation, we observe 
changes in risk coefficients from the formation to the test period.  The direction of 
change is as expected with losers becoming more risky and winners less risky.  The 
overall risk coefficient of losers rises by 9.2% to 1.31 with a general upward trend 
evident in each subperiod.  Similarly, the risk coefficient of winners decreases in 
each sub period leading to an overall decline of 18.4% to 1.02.  Overall, there is a 
combined change in risk coefficients of 27.6%. 
 
Table 7: Changes in Risk Coefficients for Winner and Loser Portfolios over a Six Year 
Horizon Period 
 
Table 7a:  Change in risk coefficients for Loser Portfolios 
Horizon period Formation Period Test Period 
 1979-1981 1982-1984 
1 1.269 1.373 
 1982-1984 1985-1987 
2 1.368 1.388 
 1985-1987 1988-1990 
3 0.756 1.016 
 1988-1990 1991-1993 
4 1.121 1.220 
 1991-1993 1994-1996 
5 1.4710 1.5552 
Overall Average (1-5) 1.197 1.310 
 
Table 7b: Change in risk coefficients for Winner Portfolios 
Horizon period Formation Period Test Period 
 1979-1981 1982-1984 
1 1.367 0.830 
 1982-1984 1985-1987 
2 1.066 0.824 
 1985-1987 1988-1990 
3 1.333 1.300 
 1988-1990 1991-1993 
4 1.382 1.198 
 1991-1993 1994-1996 
5 1.1130 0.9650 
Overall Average (1-5) 1.252 1.023 
 
While not inconsequential, this is nowhere near the change in risk observed by Ball 
and Kothari (1989) who, on the basis of their CAPM methodology, find almost a 
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100% swing in betas between the formation and test period.  Our results are more in 
line with De Bondt and Thaler who conclude that the “difference in risk is insufficient 
to explain the return on the arbitrage strategy”.  Furthermore, somewhat surprisingly, 
the average risk change for loser shares is much lower than those for winner shares 
despite the losers making a more significant contribution to arbitrage portfolio.  Also 
an examination of Tables 4 and 7 indicates an absence of a direct link between the 
change in risk for the various individual subperiods and the observed abnormal 
returns.  Thus it appears that changes in risk can only partly explain the abnormal 
returns from the contrarian strategy in the Irish market. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented in this paper provide some evidence of long-term returns 
reversal and hence evidence against weak-form efficiency in the Irish equity market.  
By focusing purely on past price information (which is the essence of the 
overreaction strategy) it is shown that abnormal returns can be earned.  The 
magnitude of overreaction varies with the length of the horizon period examined, and 
as we move from a two year to a six year horizon, the average cumulative abnormal 
returns earned from the arbitrage strategy increases from -1.9% to 23.0%.  While 
these results are statistically insignificant they are economically significant especially 
over the longer horizon periods. 
 
However, an extremely strong seasonal pattern is exhibited with all the returns from 
losers earned in January and the contribution of the winner firms to the arbitrage 
portfolio realised over the other 11 months.  Also the winner and loser portfolios are 
somewhat skewed with respect to company size, with a larger percentage of loser 
firms being from the small firm cohort.  This, while not providing a complete 
explanation, potentially contributes to the observed levels of excess returns.  In 
addition, while the risk of the portfolios changes in line with predictions, the extent of 
the change is insufficient to fully explain the profitability of the contrarian strategy.  
Therefore, taken individually, it would appear that firm size and changes in risk 
cannot fully explain the documented results. 
 
We conclude that the results from this study indicate a degree of inefficiency in the 
Irish stock market.  This evidence is consistent with a growing body of literature 
which details other anomalies in the Irish market.  Furthermore, Lucey (1994) 
documents a degree of serial dependence in daily returns of the ISEQ index and 
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Nugent (1996) finds evidence, although inconclusive, of speculative bubbles.  These 
observations would support the idea that there is a least some level of predictability 
in returns on the Irish market. 
 
The results of this paper suggest many avenues for future research.  First, a closer 
examination of the links between seasonality, firm size and the ‘overreaction effect’ is 
suggested.  It is conceivable that shareholder type may have some influence.  For 
example, does the presence of private, less sophisticated investors provide some 
explanation for seasonality and the impact of firm size on returns?  Second, does the 
overall volatility of the market have an influence on the extent of overreaction?  
Kearney (1996) documents that the Irish equity market occupies the middle ground 
internationally with respect to market volatility.  This may explain, given previously 
noted research, the less significant degree of reversal in comparison to some other 
markets.  Finally, an investigation based on the type of events which investors 
overreact to would be informative.  For example, are there any other common 
characteristics between extreme stocks which make them winners and losers?  And 
do investors overreact more often to one type of announcement compared to 
another? 
 
Essentially, these questions offer suggestions for further research into the 
overreaction hypothesis. Unlike most of the previous research, which had the goal of 
simply proving its existence, these questions attempt to explore why the 
phenomenon of overreaction actually occurs.  Such investigations will help in the 
achievement of De Bondt and Thaler’s original objective, that is, to explain the link 
between stock market behaviour and the psychology of individual decision making. 
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APPENDIX 1   
   
Two Year Horizon Period   
Number of Horizon Periods: 17  
Number of Stocks in Winner and Loser Portfolios for each horizon period:  
79-80  (3 stocks) 85-86  (4 stocks) 91-92  (6 stocks) 
80-81  (3 stocks) 86-87  (4 stocks) 92-93  (6 stocks) 
81-82  (3 stocks) 87-88  (4 stocks) 93-94  (7 stocks) 
82-83  (3 stocks) 88-89  (5 stocks) 94-95  (7 stocks) 
83-84  (4 stocks) 89-90  (5 stocks) 95-96  (7 stocks) 
84-85  (4 stocks) 90-91  (6 stocks)  
   
Four Year Horizon Period   
Number of Horizon Periods: 8  
Number of Stocks in Winner and Loser Portfolios for each horizon period:  
79-82 (3 stocks)   
81-84 (3 stocks)   
83-86 (4 stocks)   
85-88 (4 stocks)   
87-90 (5 stocks)   
89-92 (6 stocks)   
91-94 (6 stocks)   
93-96 (7 stocks)   
   
Six Year Horizon Period   
Number of Horizon Periods: 5  
Number of Stocks in Winner and Loser Portfolios for each horizon period:  
79-84 (3 stocks)   
82-87 (3 stocks)   
85-90 (4 stocks)   
88-93 (5 stocks)   
91-96 (6 stocks)   
 
  
 
